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HUNGARY’S TRANSITION 
TO A CAPITAL-MARKET-BASED
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Aneesh Varma
Introduction
Until the early 1990s Hungary had a bank-
based financial system, like some of its close
European allies such as Germany. However,
after the dissolution of the COMECOM1 the new
economic and political freedom allowed it to
change to a capital-market-based financial sys-
tem. In this financial system, as found in the
United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (U.K.),
institutional investors2 have greater corporate
control. Consequently stock price maximiza-
tion becomes one of the primary objectives.
(Damodaran, p. 31) The system is structured to
provide guidelines for corporate decisions, such
as return on capital, to be followed in the best
interest of stakeholders.
Countries like Germany, France, and
Japan are considered to have bank-centered
financial systems. In these countries bank
finance is crucial for raising funds for projects,
and the creditors are major shareholders. In
most cases, the bank’s executives will have close
personal relationships with the company’s man-
agement and will be involved in board meet-
ings. In Japan, for example, firms can take on
large loans from mutual-aid networks known
as keiretsu. These industrial groupings with a
large bank at the center help in the exchange
of information, trading relationships, coopera-
tive projects and, most importantly, favorable
contracts. They can also form a safety net in
case of distress, allowing firms to take the risk
of highly leveraging themselves. (Shapiro, 
1The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 1949–91,
was an economic organization of communist states and
Eastern Bloc equivalent to (but more inclusive than) the
European Economic Community. The military counterpart
to the COMECOM (or Comecon) was the Warsaw Pact.
(Wikipedia.org [a])
2Institutional investors include pension funds, mutual
funds, endowments, and insurance companies. 
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p. 341) Lending banks are also able to buy
shares in companies, which is not permitted in
capital market systems. 
This article examines the changes and
trends in the Hungarian financial system since
the move to a capital-market financial system.
First it evaluates the problems in the transition
of the financial system. Although some of these
problems arose because of Hungary’s commu-
nist past, focus is directed toward those that
resulted from weak foresight by Hungarian 
capital-market players. The article then pro-
vides some recommendations to overcome
these problems. Special attention is given to
Hungary’s recent accession to the European
Union, which gives it access to close to 500 mil-
lion more people and over $12 trillion in out-
put. Hungary’s efforts in the next few years to
reform its financial system could dictate
whether this accession remains a challenge or
becomes a great opportunity.
Current Shortcomings in the
Transition
Hungary’s transition to a capital-market
financial system has experienced shortcomings,
three of which will be addressed in this section:
a relatively small stock market capitalization,
limited prospects for venture capital and pri-
vate equity, and inadequate transparency in the
financial system. 
Stock Market Capitalization
The total value of all the shares outstand-
ing in a stock market is an important metric by
which stock markets are often compared glob-
ally. Known as stock market capitalization, it
influences the ability of local corporations to
raise money in the stock market. It also affects
liquidity, transaction costs, and the general
interest of the average household investor in
the stock market.
As early as 2000 Hungary had a stock 
market capitalization valued at 35.7 percent of
GDP, the highest among Central and East
European (CEE) countries. (European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development 2000, p. 13)
However, this number is still far less than those
of developed capital markets such as the U.S.,
where the stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP
ratio has been over 100 percent in recent years.
(Wikipedia.org [b]) Concurrently the liquidity
at the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) has also
been a matter of concern, with the turnover
velocity3 declining on the BSE in recent years
(Figure 1). Well developed exchanges like those
in London and New York exhibit turnover veloc-
ities in the range of 100–170 percent. Claessens,
Klingebiel, and Schmukler (p. 12) found that
the drop in liquidity in emerging capital mar-
kets could be due to larger companies listing
and raising capital abroad on more liquid
exchanges. This has been witnessed in Hungary,
too, which unfortunately leads the CEE coun-
tries in the number of their firms having initial
public offerings (IPOs) and trading ADRs4 in
U.S. and Europe. (Bonin and Watchel, p. 32)
Levine (p. 408) states that liquid capital mar-
kets provide confidence that investors can with-
draw their savings quickly and cheaply when
they need to. Higher liquidity can reduce
spreads and transaction costs. The growth in
the number of investors also marks the start of
mutual funds which manage the investors’
money. In the case of Hungary, within a span of
just a few years mutual funds have grown to
over $3 billion5 in assets by 2002, accounting
for five percent of Hungarian GDP. This consti-
tutes a rapid growth from the one percent level
in the mid-1990s. This is still a very small
amount compared to that in the U.S., where as
of April 2006 mutual funds controlled over 
$9 trillion, almost 75 percent of the U.S. GDP.
(Investment Company Institute) 
The other reason for the limited stock
market capitalization in Hungary is the under-
developed counterpart of the mutual funds
industry — the issuance of financial securities
by investment banks. In terms of equity
3Turnover velocity is defined as the average of annual-
ized turnover of shares per month divided by market value
at the end of each month.
4An initial public offering (IPO) occurs when the shares
of a company are first made available to the stock market,
signifying the company has gone public. American deposi-
tory receipts (ADRs) are negotiable certificates issued by a
U.S. bank representing a specified number of shares (or one
share) in a foreign stock that is traded on a U.S. exchange.
5All dollar values in this article are quoted in U.S. 
dollars, unless stated otherwise.
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issuances, the first seven years of 1990 saw just
over $1 billion raised for Hungarian firms.
Between 1997 and 2000, Hungarian firms were
able to extract over $6 billion from the equity
markets by listing on the BSE. (Securities
Database Corporation) However, when the data
are adjusted to account for just IPOs, we see
that there have been none on the BSE since
2000, which globally have been years with a
high volume of IPOs (Figure 2). Comparing
Hungary to some other emerging markets such
as India, China, and Israel, we still see a high-
er number of IPOs in these economies, espe-
cially in the biotechnology and information
technology sectors. (PricewaterhouseCoopers,
2006)
The years 2003 to 2006 have been very
opportune times for European exchanges to
host IPOs. According to the “European
Liquidity Report” put out by VentureOne, 
in 2005 the total number of European 
IPOs outnumbered the total in the U.S. A
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study in 2006
stated that the heavy regulation in the U.S. after
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was causing
firms to prefer European exchanges, such as
AIM, Euronext, and the Deutsche Borse. 
In 2005 U.S. exchanges drew only 23 
international IPOs whereas Europe attracted
123, of which 13 were U.S.-based firms.
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006) Hungary, in
contrast, has not been able to garner any
momentum in this area. Such stagnation could
affect the injection of new money into the
Hungarian stock market, hurting overall capi-
tal market growth in the country.
Venture Capital and Private Equity
Prospects
Hungary needs both venture capital (VC)
firms and private equity (PE) firms, which are
an important step in promoting innovation and
research into newer technologies. Several suc-
cessful global firms have had venture capital
roots, like Google and Cisco Systems, which
were started through Sequoia Capital. In
Hungary these firms have been operating with
limited success, but accession to the EU has
sparked interest from global players. In recent
times, such firms have been large contributors
to capital market activity in developed markets
Figure 1
Trading Activity on the Budapest Stock Exchange
Source:  Budapest Stock Exchange, 2003.
 
90
like the U.S. and the U.K., where nearly a quar-
ter of all merger and acquisition (M&A) activi-
ty is due to PE funds buying and selling firms.
(Thomson Financial)
Hungary’s main concern in relation to 
the VC activity is the relatively small size of
potential target companies. Kevin Smith 
(p. 111), a specialist in Hungarian financial
markets, writes that VC firms seek investments
over $15 million to be effective (refer to 
“critical size” in Figure 3). In 2004 only two of
the 41 VC buyouts met the threshold of $15
million. Furthermore, decisions to sponsor
ideas by VC firms are made in Western
European boardrooms, where the outlook on
innovation in Hungary remains pessimistic.
(Lenart) 
Hungary also needs to cultivate an envi-
ronment for encouraging institutional pools of
capital to be invested in VC and PE firms. These
are huge pools of capital that are in search of
alternative forms of investments. According to
McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), over the last
20 years the average return on investment on
PE projects in Europe (19.4 percent) has gen-
erally outpaced those in the U.S. (12 percent).
However, Europe still struggles to find pools of
capital interested in investing in PE and 
VC funds, raising only $40 billion in 2003,
whereas the U.S. raised three times this
amount. (MGI, p. 6) In the specific case of
Hungary, in 2004 only one pension fund invest-
ed in a VC fund. (Hungary Venture Capital and
Private Equity Association) Globally, larger 
PE and VC funds are being raised every year
owing to the strength of institutional investors
such as pension funds, endowments, and insur-
ance pools. Hungary’s VC and PE industries 
will remain underdeveloped if they are unable
to tap into these huge institutional pools of 
capital.
Trust and Transparency 
The next section will cover three main
problem areas that also hamper Hungarian 
capital-market growth: accounting standards
in the financial system, corporate governance
standards of internal management, and share-
holder rights of the external investor. 
Figure 2
Initial Public Offerings in Different Markets (Calendar Years 2003 through 2005)
Sources:  Ernst and Young (2005); PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004, 2005, 2006); Thomson Financial (2006);
Securities Database Corporation (2006).
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Accounting Standards
The success of capital markets relies on
transparency and disclosure of financial state-
ments by companies to the public investors.
Scandals such as Enron and Worldcom even in
developed capital markets like that of the U.S.
hurt investor sentiment. In the U.S., the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has strict rules about the public listing of com-
panies and disclosure policies of internal
finances. Effective January 1, 2000, Hungary
adopted Act C on Accounting, which brings it
closer to International Accounting Standards
(IAS). Since most of Western Europe follows
IAS as well, this provides a common platform
for international investors. Most of the regis-
tered firms on the Budapest Stock Exchange
also provide US GAAP financial statements to
encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) by
international investors. If Hungarian firms list
on U.S. exchanges, they will also have to follow
the guidelines of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
for foreign filers. 
However, problems still persist that need
to be resolved, especially with the EU accession.
Deloitte and Touche find that the valuation
framework for financial instruments is the
main concern with Hungarian Accounting Law
(HAL) as compared to IAS. This has a major
effect on goodwill and acquisition valuation in
M&A, which are major activities in a successful
capital market. Further reforms are needed to
align HAL with IAS to allow for favorable treat-
ment of M&A. 
Corporate Governance and
Transparency
Good corporate governance provides a set
of mechanisms designed to curtail the funda-
mental agency problem between management
and shareholders. (Becht, Bolton and Roell) It
is therefore important to have transparency and
well-structured internal controls upon which
shareholders can rely. Hungary is generally per-
ceived to have better transparency in corporate
governance compared to those of its CEE peers
in transition. (Smith, p. 112) However, its
shortcomings are common to most of the CEE
countries as well. Berglof and Pajuste (p. 286)
find that one of the main problems is excessive
intervention in management by controlling
shareholders, while minority investors are gen-
erally ignored. Minority protection is important
since it promotes new capital sources and inter-
est in stock markets. Berglof and Pajuste fur-
ther argue that, given the limitation of civil law,
regulation alone will not help, thus giving rise
to the need for stronger corporate governance.
Macey (p. 19) encourages stronger corpo-
rate governance through three main channels:
Figure 3
Venture Capital Activity in Hungary, 2004
Sources:  Hungary Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, “Statistical Survey 2005.”
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the capacity to restrict management’s ability to
obtain private benefits from control; the ease of
access to financial markets for capital; and the
ease with which inefficient management is
replaced. These form the basis of investor pro-
tection granted by the firm, as opposed to those
granted by the state through laws. Here too
Hungary has done well, and better than its CEE
peers. In fact, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) gave
Hungary a relatively high score on its annual
securities market indicator, stating that
Hungary had “some protection of minority
shareholders, relatively liquid and well func-
tioning security markets and effective regula-
tions.” (EBRD 2005, p. 39)
Hungarian firms are therefore adopting
well-defined forms of corporate governance and
are on the right track. Though it will take a 
couple of years before they can reach standards
similar to those in the U.S. and U.K., they
should also step back and learn from the mis-
takes of these countries. According to Bogle,
scandals such as Enron and Worldcom have
hinted at a movement of corporate governance
policy from “owner’s capitalism to manager’s
capitalism.” (Bogle, p. 245) Other notable
experts such as La Porta et al., Boytsun, and
Senator Paul Sarbanes have resonated Bogle’s
claim that newer “mutations” of corporate gov-
ernance are often intended to protect boards of
directors rather than shareholders. Hungary
should take lessons here and watch out for
“informal rules” that help the managerial
hubris. (Berglof and Claessens) Transparency
in the rules of corporate governance is para-
mount to the shareholders, and Hungarian
investors should insist on it. 
Shareholder Rights
Protecting even the smallest investor is
important, especially if households are to be
encouraged to consider the stock market as an
investment for their savings as opposed to bank
accounts. Boytsun notes that almost all transi-
tion economies have civil-law systems where
minority shareholders are likely to be less pro-
tected. However, under common law, courts can
use their interpretative power to penalize
opportunistic behavior of corporations and
therefore secure greater shareholder rights.
(Ergungor, p. 2872) Hungary has a civil law sys-
tem, where laws can be amended only by acts
of Parliament and ministerial decrees. In such
environments where creditor rights are more
important than shareholder rights, capital mar-
kets often are the victims and fail to reach their
potential. (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine) 
Similarly, foreign investors in Hungarian
capital markets often analyze international
indices of legal framework, which provide a
standardized view across different internation-
al capital markets. In this regard Berglof and
Pajuste (p. 282) note that among CEE countries
Hungary and Poland have set up strict regula-
tory mechanisms aimed at protecting investors
from management and majority-shareholder
fraud. The European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development Transition Report (2000, 
p. 39) corroborates that Hungary leads its 11
CEE peers and Russia with respect to exten-
siveness of law on books (written precedents)
and enforcement of this law. However, a more
comprehensive index of corporate governance
metrics is provided by Kaufmann et al., who
aggregated all such indicators and formed three
categories of indicators that encompass the
main sections of corporate governance (refer to
x-axis, Figure 4). 
Though the figure shows that Hungary
leads its CEE peers according to these corpo-
rate governance indicators, it is still far behind
the U.S., the U.K., and even Germany. Hungary
therefore must continue to assert its image as
an efficient and trustworthy capital market in
Western European boardrooms. Canning and
Hare (1996) provide evidence that in the early
1990s it was the mass privatization which
caused the initial stock market growth.
However, in the coming years Hungary has to
grow firms internally and bring them to the
capital markets. 
Hungary currently stands at an important
crossroad. Having left behind its communist
legacies, it now needs to restructure its indus-
trial specialization. It is this author’s opinion
that the time is right for Hungary to start spe-
cializing in high-value-added industry with a
specific focus on such sectors as biotechnolo-
gy, nanotechnology and communications. The
financial system is an important catalyst for this
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reform. Hungary’s recent accession to the EU
provides a stimulus for change. 
Guidelines and Recommendations for
a Successful Transition
Capital markets consist of three main play-
ers: lenders, borrowers, and facilitators. To have
a well-developed capital market, Hungary needs
to address the needs of firms that want to use
capital markets instead of bank loans to raise
funds. Firms seek liquid markets with low
transaction costs, high accounting standards,
and good shareholder protection. (Pagano 
et al.) This section will analyze these require-
ments and the need for related financial institu-
tions to support a well-developed capital market.
An Integrated Pan-European 
Stock Exchange?
Since its inception on June 21, 1990, the
BSE has done a lot to improve its capacity and
services offered. At the end of 1990 only six
equities and no government securities were
being traded on the BSE. (Nivorozhkin)
However, looking at recent trends, Koke and
Schroder state that among all CEE stock
exchanges the BSE is probably the most devel-
oped for handling high trading volume.
Furthermore, as part of an effort to create a
more integrated exchange, the BSE started
commodity trading in November 2005. The
next step is for it to make better use of tech-
nology, as is the demand of modern global busi-
ness. Even established successful exchanges are
moving to online and virtual exchanges as seen
in the announced merger of the NYSE with an
online exchange (Archipelago) in 2005. This
will in general reduce transaction costs and
open the market to more investors, both of
which can improve liquidity. Another solution
that is gaining popularity is to bring CEE
exchanges together in a common trading plat-
form. (Hasan and Malkamaki) The creation of
a pan-CEE trading exchange will allow these
Figure 4
Comparison of Corporate Governance across Various Aggregated Indicators
(1997/98 and 2000/01)
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2002).
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smaller capital markets to combine to form the
critical mass required for threshold liquidity
and activity. Zsolt Horvath (p.118), who has
served as the general manager for the BSE since
2002, has stated that efforts are underway to
bring about greater “strategic cooperation”
among neighboring exchanges to allow for joint
action. At present the Euronext Exchange inte-
grates the Belgium, France, Netherlands,
Portugal, and U.K. exchanges to allow for a pan-
Western European exchange. Its success in
becoming, at $2.9 trillion, the fifth most capi-
talized exchange in 2005 (Euronext.com) serves
as a model for the possibility of a pan-CEE
exchange. 
Shareholder Rights and Protection
Hungary has done well by empowering the
Hungarian Financial Services Supervisory
Authority (PSZAF) through passing laws which
give it more tools to exert influence on stock
market operations. In 2001 Act CXX on Capital
Markets set up the basic regulatory framework.
Hungary’s accession to the EU has been bene-
ficial, as new amendments to the Act in July
2005 have brought it closer to the EU’s
Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC) and Market
Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC). Disclosure of
financial statements and annual reports has
become synchronized and available online on
PSZAF’s website, giving easier access to even
the household investor. More importantly, these
amendments have broadened the definition 
of insider trading and market manipulation,
which again helps the smaller investor. Future
areas of improvement should be to give 
the PSZAF additional tools such as the ability
to conduct internal investigations to enforce
these acts. 
Credit Rating Mechanism
In a capital-market system, public debt of
corporations is benchmarked to the risk-free
debt (usually government debt, such as U.S.
Treasury rates), and a risk premium is added to
account for the additional financial risk depend-
ing on the firm’s credit standing. Firms like
Standard and Poors (S&P) and Moody’s provide
such ratings. At present in Hungary, no orga-
nized rating system is in place. Only certain
established and consequently less risky
Hungarian firms are covered by S&P. Most of
the riskier firms usually receive a grade from
the Ministry of Finance, which is known to be
arbitrary in its grading. Corruption can easily
help companies move their ratings higher.
Though Hungary is less corrupt and more
transparent than most of its CEE peers,
improvements are needed. In the last five years,
Hungary has slipped in the corruption percep-
tion index, indicating rising corruption
(Transparency.org, 2006). The solution is to
move the responsibility for debt ratings to an
independent body. 
Financial Institution Reform
Another very crucial element of the ven-
ture capital and private equity industries is to
have well-rooted financial intermediary insti-
tutions. Investment banks that provide M&A
advisory services are crucial in the process of
buying and selling firms. General M&A activi-
ty in Hungary has been picking up too, with a
20 percent annual increase in 2005 to $4.6 bil-
lion (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). Another
positive aspect in this regard is that, although
Hungary accounts for only five percent of M&A
activity in the CEE markets, one-third of its
activity originates from the prominent Western
European markets of Austria, Germany, and the
U.K. Such transactions as the $2.1 billion sale
of Budapest Airport to the British firm BBA in
2005 were influential in giving the Hungarian
capital markets a taste of “mega-deals.”
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006) These trans-
actions also help other sectors envision larger
and more frequent deals, especially in IT, 
manufacturing, finance, and chemicals —
Hungarian industries where consolidation is
much needed at this stage. (McKinsey Global
Institute, 2005) This also means that Hungary
is a great market for investment banks to pro-
vide advisory services.
Hungarian investment banks, however,
have had a very tumultuous time since the
banking reforms of 1987, when regulation of
the money supply began through open-market
operations, minimum reserve requirements,
and discount window rates (affecting interest
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rates). (Burant) The Act on Securities in 1990
had limited the underwriting capacity to only a
select number of security dealers, at a time
when most banks had huge non-performing
loans on their balance sheets. Although the Act
on Credit Institutions in 1997 allowed the new
larger commercial banks to begin underwrit-
ing activities, these banks are still not able to
be effective players in the capital-market envi-
ronment. (Majnoni et al.) Even though most
international investment banks such as
JPMorgan have now entered Hungary, they only
have skeleton establishments, with major deci-
sions being made in the regional offices in
Austria or Germany. There is a need for the
PSZAF to encourage the growth of the securi-
ties industry by providing a favorable and sta-
ble interest rate environment which is crucial
to the work of financial houses. 
Furthermore, there is a similar need for
institutional asset managers to start acquiring
assets from pension funds, trusts, and univer-
sity endowments. Until 2004 the government
did not allow these huge pools of capital to be
invested into alternative investments such as
venture capital and private equity (VC/PE) funds
or even hedge funds. (Smith, p. 112) European
pension funds and large endowments have
begun to favor such alternative investments. In
fact, they invested about $4.4 billion during
2005 in European VC/PE funds, up 160 percent
from 2004. (VentureOne) With its accession to
the EU, this is a very opportune time for
Hungary to encourage European funds to invest
in Hungary and start up its own VC/PE funds
to invest elsewhere in Europe.
Consideration should also be given to the
establishment of quasi-governmental agencies
to deal with structuring and securitizing capi-
tal pools. Since Hungary cannot create such a
large pool on its own, a pan-CEE agency would
serve those countries which have similar inter-
est rate environments and credit risks. The
absence of these capital-pool-based securities
(and their derivatives) can lead to an incomplete
market and therefore ineffective strategies for
the market players. Filer et al. contend that it
is also essential to develop a mortgage market.
(See the article by Adam Kornfield in this issue.)
Such debt-based instruments as mortgages,
along with auto loans, student loans, and cred-
it card debt, are important for creating a stable
and dependable interest rate framework. Filer
et al. also state that it is important to develop
quasi-governmental agencies (such as Fannie
Mae in the U.S.) which first insure mortgages
and then resell them as bundled securities in
secondary markets. This allows commercial
banks and primary creditors to move risky debt
off their balance sheets. In effect, these agen-
cies could lower the interest rates charged to
primary borrowers and help create market
niches for investors with different risk prefer-
ences. Also mortgage-backed and asset-backed
securities issued by these agencies are bought
by asset management firms, thus creating
much-needed liquidity to the market.
Conclusions
Hungary is a country with a rich heritage
and a fascinating culture. However, the
Hungarian economy is still in transition.
Through most of the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, Hungary labored under a strong
communist backdrop. The most prominent sec-
tors were heavy industries, mining, and natur-
al resource extraction. Banks provided firms in
these industries with term loans and had the
power to influence their modus operandi. But
in the new global competitive economy,
Hungary has moved out of that era. To gather
recognition on the international stage, Hungary
has to encourage its high-value-added indus-
tries like nanotechnology, biotechnology, and
specialized medicine. 
Innovation and technological break-
throughs are trademarks of a capital-market
system. Evidence in this article shows that cap-
ital markets can indeed aid Hungary’s attempt
to move into high-value-added industries.
Though there has been a recent trend to adopt
the capital-market system, Hungary still has
many important issues to address to complete
a successful transition. The government is an
important player in capital markets. Its role in
the transition should be limited, however, to
setting up quasi-governmental agencies and
enacting wide-ranging fiscal and monetary pol-
icy changes. Additional fundamental changes
have to be brought about through the work of
firms and investors, who are also major seg-
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ments of capital markets. Firms with stronger
shareholder rights have had higher value, high-
er profits, higher sales growth, and fewer cor-
porate acquisitions. These are very important
for the development of the high-value-added
industries mentioned. 
Very few economies have as of yet com-
pleted their transition from a bank-based to a
capital-market system. Hungary can develop a
very successful strategy for its own transition
by carefully analyzing other transitioning
economies as case studies to gain an under-
standing of the different entities that are
involved in capital markets. The government
cannot be the sole facilitator of the required
environment. The government can set up agen-
cies, control corruption, curb budget deficits,
and target inflation; but at best it is just like any
other participant in the capital markets. Firms
and investors, who form the other main com-
ponents of capital markets, need to work col-
laboratively to bring about some of the changes
described in this article. 
Hungary’s transition towards a capital-
market-based financial system has been promis-
ing. Among its peer group in the CEE, it has led
the way in reforms and in the use of capital
markets. However, its recent accession to the
EU gives it the unique opportunity to be an
example for other central European nations to
emulate. 
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